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DEVELOPMENTS IN WEST VIRGINIA LAW: 1986
STUDENT MATERIAL
Case Comments and Notes

Cook v. Heck's:

EROSION OF EMPLOYMENT AT WILL IN
WEST VIRGINIA

I.

INTRODUCTION

The early English common law rule governing employment was based on the
general presumption that a hiring would be for a term (generally a year), unless
a contrary intent could be shown.1 The English rule was broadly accepted in the
United States until the late nineteenth century when the doctrine of employment
at will was conceived. 2 This at will doctrine allowing either the employer or employee to terminate the employment at any time without justification, replaced
the English rule of yearly hirings and became the majority rule in American courts.
One commentator noted that "judicial acceptance of the employment at will doctrine effectively eliminated for most workers all rights as to the future from the
3
contract of employment, and thereby drained it of all substantial content." However, exceptions to the at will doctrine created by courts and legislatures in recent

I Summers, The Contract of Employment and the Rights of IndividualEmployees: Fair Representation and Employment At Will, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 1082, 1082-83 (1984). See also Feinman,
The Development of the Employment At Will Rule, 20 Am. J. LEoAL HIsT. 118, 119-20 (1976).
2 The doctrine of employment at will is attributed to a New York lawyer, Horace Gray Wood.
In his treatise on the law of master and servant, he stated that, "[w]ith us the rule is inflexible, that
a general or indefinite hiring is prima facie a hiring at will, and if the servant seeks to make it out
a yearly hiring, the burden is upon him to establish it by proof." H. WOOD, MASTER & SERVANT.
§ 134 (1877).
As Professor Summers observed, "this unsupported assertion provided the authority for the
judicially developed doctrine of employment at will." Summers, supra note 1, at 1083. Wood cited
no cases to support his proposition, although there were supporting cases, see Davis v. Gorton, 16
N.Y. 255 (1857); Bleeker v. Johnson, 51 How. Pr. 380 (N.Y.C.P. 1876); Tatterson v. Suffolk Mfg.
Co., 106 Mass. 56 (1870); Franklin Mining Co. v. Harris, 24 Mich. 115 (1871). Summers, supra note
1, at 1083, n.7.
3 Summers, supra note 1, at 1085.
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years indicate a trend away from an absolute application of that doctrine. 4

The principle of employment at will, first adopted in 1 91 3 ,5 is still the general
rule in West Virginia today. However, contractual or statutory provisions to the
contrary6 and the "public policy" exception 7 have modified the at will status of
employees. These exceptions were designed to alleviate the harshness of the at

will doctrine or, more specifically, to protect the employee from arbitrary dismissals.
Cook v. Heck's Inc.8 represents a further erosion of the employment at will
doctrine. In Cook, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals held that "an
employee handbook may form the basis of a unilateral contract if there is a
definite promise therein by the employer not to discharge covered employees except for specific reasons." 9

This comment will discuss the developments in the area of at will employment
which led to the court's holding in Cook and its contribution to the erosion of
the at will employment doctrine in West Virginia.
II.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The plaintiff, Faith W. Cook, was a salesperson for the defendant, M & W
Distributors, a subsidiary of Heck's Inc. She was fired immediately following the

4 Examples of federal and state legislation protecting employees include:(1)
National Labor
Relations Act of 1935, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982).
(2) Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 703(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1982).
(3) Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, § 204(a), 5 U.S.C. § 7513(a) (1982).

(4)
(5)

W. VA. CODE § 21-lA-1(1985).
W. VA. CODE § 5-11-1 (1979).

Professor Minda has identified three judicially created exceptions to the common law rule of
employment at will:
The first is premised upon contract theories that seek to rebut the presumption of
indefinite employment by allowing at will employees to prove that a promise of job security
was either implied-in-fact, or made enforceable by reasonable employee reliance....
The second basic approach has been the judicially created public policy exception. A
number of courts have recognized an exception to the at will rule when the discharge of
an employee would contravene some clear, specific and well-articulated public policy....
A third approach is based on the idea that every employment contract, even those of
indefinite duration, contains an implied-in-law covenant requiring the parties to exercise
"good faith" and "fair dealing" in the performance of the contract.
Minda, The Common Law of Employment At Will in New York: The Paralysis of Nineteenth Century
Doctrine, 36 SYRACUSE L. REv. 93 9, 951-52 (1985).
1 Resener v. Watts, Ritter & Co., 73 W. Va. 342, 80 S.E. 839 (1913).
6 Bell v. South Penn Natural Gas Co., 135 W. Va. 25, 31-32, 62 S.E.2d 285, 288 (1950).
7 Harless v. First Nat'l Bank, 162 W. Va. 116, 124, 246 S.E.2d 270, 275 (1978).
' Cook v. Heck's Inc., 342 S.E.2d 453 (W. Va. 1986).
9 Id. at 459.
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dismissal of her husband, Douglas Cook, who was allegedly competing with Heck's
in the purchase of a chain of discount stores. Her complaint alleged breach of
contract, violation of W. Va. Code, section 21-5-4 (Wage Payment and Collection
Act), conspiracy, and intentional, reckless and malicious infliction of emotional
distress.' 0 The circuit court directed a verdict for the defendant on all counts,
except the statutory violation."
The supreme court, per Justice McHugh, reversed the directed verdict on the
breach of contract count 2 and remanded for a new trial on the issues of whether
a contract existed limiting M & W's right to terminate Ms. Cook without cause
and whether M & W breached the contract. 3 The lower court's judgment on the
remaining counts were affirmed. 14 Justice Neely, the lone dissenter, found 5sufficient evidence to direct a verdict but did not elaborate on his conclusion.
Two months after the Cook decision, a federal district court in West Virginia
was faced with a similar employment contract question. Zeedick v. Thomas Memorial Hospital6 also involved a personnel handbook.
The plaintiff, John F. Zeedick, an anesthesiologist, was hired in 1972 to head
the defendant's anesthesia department. In 1980, Zeedick was discharged for the
proffered reason that the defendant could not meet Zeedick's salary requirements.
Yet, Zeedick retained his privileges at Thomas Memorial and continued to practice
as an anesthesiologist in the Charleston area until 1982.
Zeedick's complaint contained several theories. However, the count alleging
that the defendant breached an employment contract is the only theory noted for
the purposes of this article. The defendant moved for summary judgment on the
ground that no contract of employment existed by virtue of the employment at
will doctrine. The district court judge, Charles H. Haden, II, distinguished 7the
Cook decision and granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment.1
III. PRIoR LAw
A. Development of Employment At Will Principle in West Virginia
Resener v. Watts, Ritter & Co.' 8 gave the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals the first opportunity to determine whether an employment was for a year
or at will when the duration of the employment-was not specified.
10Id. at 455.
" Id.
,z Id. at 459.
,3 Id. at 460.
' Id. at 460-61.
at 462.
" Id.
16 Zeedick v. Thomas Memorial Hospital, No. 85-0787 (S.D. W. Va. June 5, 1986) (order granting summary judgment).
,7 Id. slip op. at 4.
" Resener, 73 W. Va. 342, 80 S.E. 839.
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The plaintiff, Resener, was a traveling salesman for the defendant, Watts,
Ritter & Co. Although there was no fixed term of employment, both parties agreed
that Resener was to be paid a monthly salary and a five percent commission at
the end of the year. After two and a half years of service, Resener notified the
company of his intention to quit. The company had no objection to his leaving
but refused to pay him the commission he had earned to that point.
Resener argued that his employment was terminable at will and that upon
voluntary withdrawal, he was entitled to the earned commission. The defendant
company contended that the employment was for the definite period of one year
and that because he quit before full performance, Resener could not recover his
commission. Though the jury found in favor of the plaintiff, the trial court set
aside the verdict and awarded a new trial. 19 On appeal, the supreme court reversed
the trial court's ruling and reinstated the jury's verdict. 20 The court initially observed that "[tihe authorities, while not wholly in accord, generally state the
doctrine applicable to such cases to be that an employment upon a weekly, monthly,
or annual salary ... is presumed to be a hiring at will." 2'
In addition to citing cases from other states, 22 the court also noted that:
The doctrine applied by the great majority of the courts, which have so far (1913)
expressed an opinion on the subject, consists essentially in a complete repudiation
of the presumption that a general or indefinite hiring for a year, and the sub-

stitution of another presumption, viz., that such a hiring is a hiring at will. Under
this doctrine, the burden of proving that such a hiring was obligatory for a year

rests on the party who seeks to establish that the contract covered that period.?3
The court also cited the originator of the employment at will doctrine:
[A] hiring at so much a day, week, month or year, no time being specified, is

an indefinite hiring, and no presumption attaches that it was for a day even, but
only at the rate fixed for whatever time the party may serve; ... and in such
cases the contract may be put an end to by either party at any time, unless the
time is fixed, and a recovery had, at the rate fixed, for the services actually

rendered. 24

Persuaded by the majority rule, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
concluded that "the contract proved was for an indefinite term, and, therefore,
revocable at the will of either party." 25 Thus, Resener was not obliged to serve
until the end of the year in order to recover his commission.
19Id. at 343, 80 S.E. at 839.
21

Id. at 346-47, 80 S.E. at 840-41.
Id. at 344, 80 S.E. at 840.

2

Id. at 344-45, 80 S.E. at 840.

2

23 Id. at 345, 80 S.E. at 840 (citing 1 LABA-r ON MAS. & Serv. § 159).
24 Id., 80 S.E.2d at 840 (citing H. WOOD supra note 2 at § 136).

Id. at 346, 80 S.E. at 840.
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The resolution of the Resener case was undoubtedly equitable. Ironically, in
fairly resolving that case, the court adopted a legal principle which opened the
door to arbitrary dismissals. While the at will doctrine allowed employees the
freedom of resignation, it also permitted employers to dismiss employees without
cause.
In 1947, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals reaffirmed the employment at will principle in Adkins v. Aetna Life Ins. Co.,26 but three years
later, Judge Haymond, who penned the Adkins opinion, introduced the first exception to the at will doctrine. 27
B. Development of Exceptions to the Employment At Will Principle
in West Virginia
While the employment at will principle endured in the final disposition of
Bell v. South Penn Natural Gas Co.,21 the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals in dictum noted that "[u]nder the law governing the relation of master and
servant an employment, unaffected by contractual or statutory provisions to the
contrary, may be terminated, with or without cause, at the will of either party. "29
Stated in the reverse, this means that contractual or statutory provisions to the
contrary can limit the liberty to terminate an employment relationship.
It is difficult to surmise from the opinion whether the introduction of this
exception was deliberate or unintended. The court cited no case law from other
states and merely relied on the Corpus Juris Secundum for this proposition. Regardless of the court's intent, its dictum in Bell represented the first qualification
of the employment at will principle and provided the basis for subsequent decisions
to erode this doctrine further.
Five years after Bell, in Wright v. Standard Ultramarine& Color Co.,30 Judge
Haymond, again writing for the majority, restated the rule that "[w]hen a contract
of employment is of indefinite duration it may be terminated at any time by either
party to the contract." 31 He also repeated the widely accepted notion that consideration, in addition to the employee's service and the employer's payment of32
wages must be offered to rebut the presumption of an employment at will.
However, this requirement of additional consideration would later be discarded
as the court adjusted the doctrine according to the tenor of the times.33

21

Adkins v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 130 W. Va. 362, 43 S.E.2d 372 (1947).
Bell, 135 W. Va. 25, 62 S.E.2d 285.

- Id., 62 S.E.2d at 285.
29 Id. at 32, 62 S.E.2d at 288 (citing 56 C.J.S. Mas. & Serv. § 31).
Wright v. Standard Ultramarine & Color Co., 141 W. Va. 368, 90 S.E.2d 459 (1955).
Id. at Syl. pt. 2, 90 S.E.2d at 461 SyL. pt. 2.
32 Id. at 381, 90 S.E.2d at 467 (citing 56 C.J.S. Mas. & Serv. § 31).

11See, infra, note 55 and accompanying text.
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In 1978, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals had occasion to decide
whether an employee at will can recover damages against his employer when his
discharge violates a substantial public policy. In Harless v. FirstNational Bank,34
the plaintiff, John C. Harless, was manager of the consumer credit department
in the defendant's bank. He alleged that the defendant fired him in retaliation
for his efforts to require the defendant to operate in compliance with the state
and federal consumer credit and protection laws."
The employer's chief defense was that the plaintiff's employment was for no
fixed term and therefore terminable at the will of either party, with or without
cause. 6 The court agreed that "[t]his undoubtedly is an established rule, '3 7 but
"the general rule does not dispose of the issue in this case." 38 The court seized
the opportunity to examine the "growing trend that recognizes that an employer
may subject himself to liability if he fires an employee who is employed at will
if the employee can show that the firing was motivated by an intention to contravene some substantial public policy." 3 9
In addition to citing "substantial support from commentators",
discussed several decisions from other states 41 and held that:

40

the court

Harless, 162 W. Va. 116, 246 S.E.2d 270.
Id. at 118, 246 S.E.2d at 272.
3 Id. at 119, 246 S.E.2d at 273.
Id. at 119-20, 246 S.E.2d at 273 (citing Wright, 90 S.E.2d 459, and Adair v. U.S., 208 U.S.
161 (1908)).
Id. at 120, 246 S.E.2d at 273.
39Id., 246 S.E. at 273.
,0Id. at 124, 246 S.E.2d at 275 (citing Blades, Employment At Will v. Individual Freedom:
On Limiting the Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLtM. L. REv. 1404 (1967); Blumberg,
CorporateResponsibility and the Employee's Duty of Loyalty and Obedience: A PreliminaryInquiry,
24 OKLA. L. REv. 279 (1971); Blumrosen, Settlement of Disputes Concerning the Exercise of Employer
Disciplinary Power: U.S. Report, 18 RurGas L. Rnv. 428 (1964); Weyand, Present Status of Individual Rights, N.Y.U. 22ND Am. Corer. ON LAB. 171 (1971); Note, A Common Law Action for
the Abusively DischargedEmployee, 26 HAT INGs L.J. 1435 (1975); Note, Implied Contract Rights
to Job Security, 26 STAN. L. REv. 335 0974)). (See also Decker, Reinstatement as a Remedy for A
Pennsylvania Employer's Breach of a Handbook or an Employment Policy, 90 Dicx. L. Rv.41,
42, n.6 (1985). He listed 16 recent commentaries critical of the employment at will concept.)
11Id. at 120-23, 246 S.E.2d at 273-74 (citing Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975),
(employee fired for performing jury duty); Sventko v. Kroger Co., 69 Mich. App. 644, 245 N.W.2d
151 (1976), (employee dismissed for filing workmen's compensation claim); Frampton v. Central Indiana Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973), (employee fired for filing workmen's compensation claim); Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974), (employee dismissed
for refusing to go out with her foreman); Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96, 364
N.E.2d 1251 (1977), (employee fired for demanding sales commission); Petermann v. International
Brotherhood of Teamsters, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959), (employee discharged for refusing
to testify falsely before a legislative committee); Glenn v. Clearman's Golden Cock Inn Inc., 192 Cal.
App. 2d 793, 13 Cal. Rptr. 769 (1961), (employees fired for applying for union membership). The
Court also noted that the courts in Geary v. U.S. Steel Corp., 456 Pa. 171, 319 A.2d 174 (1974),
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We conceive that the rule giving the employer the absolute right to discharge
an at will employee must be tempered by the further principle that where the
employer's motivation for the discharge contravenes some substantial public policy

principle then the employer may be liable to the employee for damages occasioned
by the discharge.

2

With the decision in Harless, the court not only redressed an inequity, but,

more importantly, it adopted a significant modification to the employment at will
rule in West Virginia. The public policy exception served as the basis for rem-

edying retaliatory and wrongful dismissals in the early 1980s.
In Shanholtz v. Monongahela Power Co., 43 the court held that "[i]t is a
because
contravention of public policy and actionable to discharge an employee
44

he has filed a workmen's compensation claim against his employer."

In Stanley v. Sewell Coal Co.,45 the plaintiff, Kenneth E. Stanley, an employee

of Sewell Coal Company, was injured in an industrial accident.4 Sewell falsely
reported the accident to the Mine Enforcement Safety Administration as a no
lost-time accident and then discharged Stanley to prevent discovery of its false
"constructive fraud ...
report.47 The court found that this constituted
4
contravened a substantial public policy". 8

which

The public policy exception was once again employed in Cordle v. General
Hugh Mercer Corp.49 to correct a wrongful dismissal. The court held that "it is

contrary to the public policy of West Virginia for an employer to require or
request that an employee submit to a polygraph test or similar test as a condition
of employment." 50
The decisions in Harless, Shanholtz, Stanley, and Cordle illustrate that the
West Virginia Supreme Court will not hesitate to modify a rigid rule of law to
achieve a fair result. Furthermore, these decisions paved the way for the court

Jackson v. Minidoka Irrigation Dist., 98 Idaho 330, 563 P.2d 54 (1977), and Larsen v. Motor Supply
Co., 117 Ariz. 507, 573 P.2d 907 (1977) have indicated that they were willing to recognize the public
policy exception to at will employment. (See also Decker, supra note 39, at 42, n.4. This commentator
found that 18 states have recognized a judicially created public policy exception to at will employment,
nine states and the District of Columbia indicate they might adopt the public policy exception to at
will employment under appropriate circumstances, and six states have expressly rejected a judicially
created public policy exception.).
41 Id. at 124, 246 S.E.2d at 275.
41Shanholtz v. Monongahela Power Co., 165 W. Va. 305, 270 S.E.2d 178 (1980).
Id. Syl. pt. 2, 270 S.E.2d at 180 Syl. pt.2.
41 Stanley v. Sewell Coal Co., 169 W. Va. 72, 285 S.E.2d 679 (1981).
46 Id. at 73, 285 S.E.2d at 681.
41Id., 285 S.E.2d at 681.

Id. at 77, 285 S.E.2d at 683.
,1 Cordle v. General Hugh Mercer Corp., 325 S.E.2d Ill (W. Va. 1984).
" Id. at 117.

41
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to embark on a further deviation from the employment at will doctrine.
IV.

DISCUSSION

In Cook, the crucial issue to be resolved by the court was whether job security
guarantees, promises not to discharge except for cause, or express termination
procedures contained in an employee handbook may be contractual provisions
5
that abrogate the at will nature of the employment. '
At the outset, the court reaffirmed the general rule that West Virginia is an
"at will" jurisdiction.5 2 But the at will principle is not wholly unqualified, as
contractual and statutory provisions and the public policy exception have altered
the at will status of an employment.53 These qualifications, however, were not
broad enough to embrace the facts in Cook.
The issue being one of first impression, the court looked to decisions in other
jurisdictions. Ten states recently held that an employer may be bound by promises,
express or implied, in employee handbooks or policy manuals with respect to job
security and termination procedures. 54 Persuaded by these cases, the court concluded that:
[A] promise of job security contained in an employee handbook distributed by
an employer to its employees constitutes an offer for a unilateral contract; and
an employee's continuing to work, while under no obligation to do so, constitutes
an acceptance and sufficient consideration to make the employer's promise binding
and enforceable. 51
This statement effectively cast aside the traditional requirement of additional consideration beyond wages and service to overcome the presumption of a hiring at
will.

Cook, 342 S.E.2d at 457.
52

Id.

at 457 (citing Wright, 141 W. Va. 368, 90 S.E.2d 459).

Id. at 457 (citing Bell, 135 W. Va. 25, 62 S.E.2d 285, Shanholtz, 165 W. Va. 305, 270 S.E.2d
178, and Harless, 162 W. Va. 116, 246 S.E.2d 270).
-1 Id. at 457 (citing Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880
(1980); Weiner v. McGraw Hill, Inc., 57 N.Y.2d 458, 443 N.E.2d 441, 457 N.Y.S.2d 193 (1982);
Shah v. American S3nthetic Rubber Corp., 655 S.W.2d 489 (Ky. 1983); Pine River St. Bank v. Mettille,
333 N.W.2d 622 (Minn. 1983); Leikvold v. Valley View Community Hosp., 141 Ariz. 544, 688 P.2d
170 (1984); Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 102 Wash. 2d 219, 685 P.2d 1081 (1984); Woolley v.
Hoffmann-La Roche Inc., 99 N.J. 284, 491 A.2d 1257 (1985); Ferraro v. Koelsch, 124 Wis. 2d 154,
368 N.W.2d 666 (1985); Mobil Coal Prod. Inc. v. Parks, 704 P.2d 702 (Wyo. 1985); Thompson v.
Am. Motor Inns, Inc., 623 F. Supp. 409 (W.D. Va. 1985). See Annot., 33 A.L.R. 4th 120 (1984)).
(See also Decker, supra note 39, at 48, nn.35, 47. This commentator found at least 25 states which
have held that handbooks and employment policies are binding contractual commitments while 8
states refused to so find).
1 Id. at 459.
53
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In examining the cases from other jurisdictions, the court found that "[a]
common thread running through those cases where personnel manuals are viewed
as contracts is the existence of a definite promise by the employer not to discharge
the employee except for cause. ' 56 Concurring with these authorities, the court
held that "an employee handbook may form the basis of a unilateral contract
promise therein by the employer not to discharge except for
if there is a definite
' 57
specified reasons.
After reading M & W's handbook, the court found "evidence of a promise
by the employer not to discharge those employees who are explicitly covered by
the handbook, except for the offenses set forth in the handbook. '"58' The court
also pointed out that, "[t]he inclusion in the handbook of specified discipline for
violations of particular rules accompanied by a statement that the disciplinary
rules constitute a complete list is primafacie evidence of an offer for a unilateral
contract of employment modifying the right of the employer to discharge without
cause."5 9 However, the court remanded the case for the jury to determine whether
the handbook specifically applied to Ms. CookA0
Within two months of this decision, a federal district court had occasion to
apply Cook when confronted with a similar employment case involving a personnel
handbook. In Zeedick v. Thomas Memorial Hospital,61 the district court observed
that even after Cook, the presumption of employment at will remains in West
Virginia. The court analyzed the opinion and concluded that in Cook "the demonstration of a contract on the basis of a personnel manual is premised on 'the
existence62of a definite promise by the employer not to discharge except for good
cause'."
In Zeedick, the district court found in the defendant's handbook only a promise to confer with the person to be dismissed and that the grounds for termination
appear unlimited. 63 Applying Cook, the district court held that:
What the language of this personnel handbook lacked is the promise, one which
was present in Cook, that a person would be discharged only for specified reasons.
That element lacking, the rule of law is employment at will and there is no action

56 Id.

" Id.
58 Id.
59 Id.
60

Id.

61Zeedick, No. 85-0787 (S.D. W. Va. June 5, 1986).

a Id. slip op. at 3.
61Id. slip op. at 4.
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on the basis of employment contract as this contract was terminable by either
party at either time. 61
Essentially, this means that the employment at will rule will govern despite an
employee handbook so long as the reasons for dismissal are unlimited, thereby
creating no promises not to dismiss except for specified reasons.
While the court's decision in Cook is undoubtedly a significant modification
to the employment at will rule, its limitation is already evident. In order to circumvent the courts in finding a promise" not to discharge except for good cause
or specified reasons, an ingenious employer could have an open-ended list of
reasons for dismissal in its personnel handbook. However, from the line of cases
leading to Cook, it appears that the court is capable of devising another qualification to the at will rule should employers manage to frustrate the intent of
Cook.
V.

CONCLUSION

In recent years, extensive legislation and judicial modification designed to
ensure job security manifest concern for the worker. In Cook, the court continued
to extend protection to the rights of employees. The almost unanimous decision,
with one justice dissenting without opinion, revealed the court's propensity toward
upholding employees' rights as it acknowledged that:
A policy manual that provides for job security grants an important, fundamental
protection for workers .... If such a commitment is indeed made, obviously an
employer should be required to honor it. When such a document, purporting to
give job security, is distributed by the employer to a workforce, substantial injustice may result if that promise is broken. 65
Such judicial protection is justified when considered in light of the bargaining
position between the employer and employee. As it is generally an employer's
market, most employees do not have the luxury of freely giving up their jobs for
another any time even though the at will principle supposedly gives them that
freedom.

6 Id. slip op. at 4. The defendant hospital published a handbook which covered various kinds
of prohibited conduct and discussed termination procedures as follows:
Dismissal....
There are two general conditions that subject employees to suspension and/or dismissal. The first is
failure to carry out the reasonable directions of a supervisor (insubordination). The second includes
(but is not limited to) serious misconduct such as neglect or abuse of patients, visitors, or fellow
workers, abuse or destruction of property; also theft, excessive absenteeism, unexcused absence, unkindness, discourtesy, etc.
Id. slip op. at 3.
6, Cook, 342 S.E.2d at 458 (citing Woolley, 99 N.J. 284, 297, 491 A.2d 1257, 1264).
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As one commentator astutely observed:
[M]any employers of nonunion employees attempt to maintain considerable unilateral discretion and view the statements in their handbooks and employment
policies as general guidelines, subject to withdrawal, modification, exceptions, or
interpretation at any time by the employer. Recently, many of these employers
have been unpleasantly surprised to discover that courts are now consistently
upholding these statements as binding commitments that may imply other rights
as well. Consequently, employers should treat their handbooks and employment
policies as they would collective bargaining agreements, i.e., as binding and enforceable commitments.66
The decision in Cook should not be viewed as a mere unpleasant surprise but
an unequivocal message to employers that they no longer enjoy an absolute free
hand in firing employees. While the court may not have renounced the at will
rule, given its lack of tolerance for arbitrary and retaliatory dismissals, the court
seems prepared to fashion remedies to correct such injustices.
The recognition of an employee handbook as an actionable promise by the
employer signifies an important point in employer-employee relations. The immediate effect of Cook is that it represents another jolt to employers who engage
-in arbitrary dismissals from the license afforded by the at will principle. While
it is true that the court in Cook did not abandon the at will principle, the court
in future cases may fashion its decisions to require that an employer discharge
employees only upon good cause, such as unsatisfactory performance or a genuine
need for retrenchments, with or without such a promise in its employee handbook. 67 Ultimately, Cook demonstrates that the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals, no longer satisfied with mechanically repeating the employment at will
rule, will continue to modify the rule to protect the rights of workers.

Francesca Tan

11Decker,

supra note 39, at 45.
61 For a discussion of future development of the at will doctrine, see Summers, supra note 1,
at 1105-07.
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